Search results for "Common value auction"
showing 10 items of 15 documents
Brokers in the tea trade between China and West Africa
2021
Brokers have played important roles in the trade of green tea between China and Mali, from the 19th century when tea first came to Mali up to the present. They mediate between tea buyers and sellers, work on their own account, use soft skills, knowledge and networks and make a living from the commission they gain. This article examines the work of brokers in the tea trade, the social constellations in which they are active and the scope of their activity. Based on extensive field research in Mali and China, this article shows how brokers create their own jobs in a dynamic business landscape, which is often delimited by governmental policies, competing entrepreneurial activities and social …
Combinatorial Double Auction Radio Resource Allocation Model in Crowd Networks
2018
International audience; Industrial Partners (IPs) with Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are extending the mobile network infrastructure with Small Cells (SCs) in order to meet the growing mobile traffic demand. Due to the increasing number of telecommunication market competitors and the scarcity of radio resources, static sharing schemes are no more efficient. New dynamic schemes should be considered to meet both user expectations and economic success. In a crowd networking context, we propose in this work a dynamic radio resource scheme based on combinatorial double auctions. The participants in these auctions are the MNOs considered as buyers and the IPs, providers of SCs, considered as se…
Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: Two Masters
2018
Available online: 05 June 2018 We study common agency problems in which two principals (groups) make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent's action. Our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments. For our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium, which typically involves randomization by both principals. Greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition. The principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards, sometimes strictly. With rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups with punishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals. We study whether…
Designing multi-attribute auctions for engineering services procurement in new product development in the automotive context
2010
Abstract In recent years, use of multi-attribute auctions has been consolidating as a powerful mechanism in procurement settings where multiple drivers affect the transaction outcome. This paper provides a project management approach for multi-attribute auction design for standardized engineering services procurement in the context of new product development in automotive industry. Two variables are taken into account in the bidding process: price and duration of the given engineering activity. From a theoretical viewpoint, we fully determine optimal suppliers’ bidding strategies and expected outcomes, i.e. score/utility, price and duration, for the buyer under both first score sealed bid a…
A breath of fresh air: french books in the Catalogues of the 18th century of the bookshop Mallén of Valencia
2013
Los Catálogos de libros constituyen junto a las subastas de libros y los inventarios de bibliotecas las fuentes más importantes para el estudio del mundo del libro durante el siglo XVIII. A través del estudio de los libros franceses procedentes de los Catálogos de la familia Mallén de libreros de Valencia se pretende conocer mejor los autores y obras que circularon en la ciudad, además de los circuitos, proveedores y clientes de tal comercio. Un negocio que contribuyó a modernizar las estructuras culturales y políticas del momento. The Catalogues of books constitute close to the auctions of books and the inventories of libraries the most important sources for the study of the world of the b…
Impact of Risk Aversion on Bidder's Optimal Strategy in Takeover Contests
2008
We consider a takeover setting in which bidders are risk averse and study aversion's consequences on their strategy. We found that when bidders are risk averse, under some conditions, their overbidding depends on the size of toeholds they hold. We show that there is a threshold under that a bidder doesn't overbid into the takeover process and becomes aggressive above that treshold. However, if the overbidding increases in toeholds size, it decreases in valuation. Without toeholds, takeovers's results are similar if bidders are averse or neutral risk.
Financial Evaluation of SLA-based VM Scheduling Strategies for Cloud Federations
2017
In recent years, cloud federations have gained popularity. Small as well as big cloud service providers (CSPs) join federations to reduce their costs, and also cloud management software like OpenStack offers support for federations. In a federation, individual CSPs cooperate such that they can move load to partner clouds at high peaks and possibly offer a wider range of services to their customers. Research in this area addresses the organization of such federations and strategies that CSPs can apply to increase their profit.In this paper we present the latest extensions to the FederatedCloudSim framework that considerably improve the simulation and evaluation of cloud federations. These si…
Smart Auctions for Autonomic Ambient Intelligence Systems
2020
The main goal of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) is to support users in their daily activities by satisfying and anticipating their needs. To achieve such goal, AmI systems rely on physical infrastructures made of heterogenous sensing devices which interact in order to exchange information and perform monitoring tasks. In such a scenario, a full achievement of AmI vision would also require the capability of the system to autonomously check the status of the infrastructure and supervise its maintenance. To this aim, in this paper, we extend some previous works in order to allow the self-management of AmI devices enabling them to directly interact with maintenance service providers. In particular,…
Design of Public Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Cleaning Contracts
2018
We analyze a regime change from beauty contests to first-price sealed-bid and scoring auctions, using Swedish data on public procurement of cleaning services. In beauty contests, the lowest bid often lost, leaving substantial money on the table. The procurement costs were similar before and after the regime change: (i) Entry strongly decreases the procurement cost but did not change. Entry would have decreased had the municipalities not adjusted the objects of auctions. (ii) Municipalities favored in-house suppliers in the old regime, leading to more aggressive bidding by others. With favoritism reduced, these changes balanced each other out. Peer reviewed
Shilling, Squeezing, Sniping. A further explanation for late bidding in online second-price auctions
2021
Abstract Several studies provide empirical evidence for sniping (i.e., waiting until the last few seconds to bid) in second-price internet auctions, particularly in auctions at eBay . This evidence was regarded as puzzling and an anomaly for an extended period: How could sniping be consistent with rational behaviour in second-price auctions, where theory predicts that bids’ timing plays no role and there is no incentive to bid less than one’s private value. An essential contribution to this puzzling issue has been the insight by Bose and Daripa (2017) that late bidding is itself a response to the shilling. Their paper explains well late bidding for repeating auctions. However, late bidding …